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2Queen’s University Belfast QTo address the shortage of cross-cultural research on putative, panhuman fea-
tures of moral judgement, Fessler et al. [1] conducted a study with samples
drawn from seven different societies. There is much to be praised in their
efforts, which advance the recent debate initiated by Kelly et al. [2] regarding
whether people view harmful transgressions as independent of authority
(wrong regardless of the view of any legitimate authority) and universally
wrong (wrong in all places and times), as argued by Turiel and his colleagues
over the last four decades, and by ourselves in the context of this debate [3–6].
Fessler et al. claim that people do not conceive harmful transgressions as
authority independent and universally wrong because people’s third-party
moral judgements evolved to ‘increase individual fitness within local culturally
constructed social arenas’, which implies that their judgements should be
parochial: they should not be sensitive to wrongdoings distant in space and
time and they should be sensitive to the opinion of local authorities. Moreover,
Fessler et al. claim that their new study supports their moral parochialism
hypothesis, providing a ‘powerful challenge’ to positions like Turiel’s and
ours. Here, we argue that Fessler et al.’s findings can be interpreted in a way
that is quite consistent with our position, and that provides instead a powerful
challenge to their evolutionary, moral parochialism hypothesis.
We [3,4] entered the aforementioned debate by offering an empirically
guided methodological critique of the research of Kelly et al. We also proposed
a deflationary reformulation of Turiel’s original hypothesis in which harmful
transgressions are understood as authority independent and universally
wrong when they are perceived to involve injustice and basic-rights violations [5,6].
One major criticism we had of Kelly et al.’s study is that it presented
participants cases of harmful actions, such harm as military training or as
punishment, that many participants viewed as justifiable [3,4]. Fessler et al.
have taken a large step in addressing this earlier criticism by employing vign-
ettes depicting harmful actions that appear to involve ‘clear and substantial
harm, violations of rights and/or injustice’. Indeed, in this respect, their new
study provides an excellent test of our hypothesis.
Their study included seven cases of harm ostensibly involving injustice,
such as a woman being raped or a man battering his wife without provocation.
They presented participants with such cases, and assessed their moral judge-
ments of the harmful acts on a 5-point badness/goodness scale: ‘How good
or bad is what A did?’ (‘Extremely bad’; ‘Bad’; ‘Neither good or bad’;
‘Good’; ‘Extremely good’). After answering this first question, participants
were provided with probes concerning authority dependence, temporal dis-
tance and spatial distance (for details, see [1]). For each of these questions,
participants were assessed again with the same 5-point badness/goodness
scale. The aim of the task is to probe whether participants will change their
initial judgements of wrongdoing, given the approval of a local authority or
the fact that the action occurred in a distant time or place.
In the context of the task, evidence consistent with our hypothesis are
instances where a participant initially thinks the harmful acts are wrong
(i.e. ‘Extremely Bad’ or ‘Bad’), and then does not reverse their position to
not-wrong (i.e. ‘Neither good nor bad’, ‘Good’ or ‘Extremely good’) following
the authority, temporal and spatial distance probes. If the majority of responses
involve retention of the initial judgement of wrongdoing, this would beMentioned
Table 1. Percentage of responses that involve non-reversals of the initial
judgement of wrongdoing, i.e. ‘Extremely bad’ or ‘Bad’ responses that were
not changed to ‘Neither good nor bad’, ‘Good’ or ‘Extremely good’, in each of







Tsimane 88 77 84
Shuar 94 92 92
Karo Batak 96 91 91
Storozhnitsa 98 89 88
Sursurunga 96 97 98
Yasawa 87 86 83
California 86 90 89
Table 2. Percentage of responses that did not reduce, to any degree, the
initial badness judgement. Thus, responses that changed from ‘Extremely







Tsimane 69 59 67
Shuar 80 78 75
Karo Batak 70 67 63
Storozhnitsa 69 56 57
Sursurunga 83 81 82
Yasawa 75 75 73



































































ARTICLE IN PRESSconsistent with our account, but not with the parochialist
account. Fessler et al. do not describe their results in a
manner that could test our hypothesis, i.e. that present the
amount of responses that involve non-reversals of the initial
judgement of wrongdoing. Table 1 presents such a break-
down of Fessler et al.’s results. As can be seen, the vast
majority of responses from all seven field sites involve non-
reversals of the initial judgement of wrongdoing, and this
was true across all three probes.
Obviously, there is still a non-negligible minority that
did reverse their initial judgement of wrongdoing. However,
there are several ways of explaining these minority
responses that are compatible with our hypothesis [3–6].
For example, it is possible that, in response to the author-
ity’s approval of the act, participants inferred that the
authority possessed some deeper insight about the event
(e.g. additional reasons why the man slapped his wife),
which led them to transform their construal of the injustice
of the act. As the authors did not measure the perceived
injustice of the act before or after the presentation of the
authority dependence probe, it is unclear whether partici-
pants who reversed their judgement also changed their
construal of the injustice of the event.
When Fessler et al.’s data are viewed in this alternative
manner, it becomes apparent that moral-parochialist responses
represent a tiny minority cross-culturally. This provides a
powerful challenge to their evolutionary argument about
moral parochialism, since one cannot support an evolutionary
argument about the nature of moral judgements with a cross-
cultural minority. Instead, their findings become more consist-
ent with an alternative evolutionary hypothesis, based on
mutualism [7], which argues that intuitions about authority
independence and universalism follow from the panhuman
disposition to think in terms of reciprocal social contracts
that obligate people to respect the basic interests of others by
not selfishly harming one another [6].
However, Fessler et al. may reply that their perspective is
predicated on the idea that people’s moral judgements cannot
be dichotomized in terms of judging that an action is wrong
(i.e. ‘Extremely bad’ and ‘Bad’) or not-wrong (i.e. ‘Neither
good nor bad’, ‘Good’ and ‘Extremely good’) as we did in
our interpretation of their results, since from their perspective
these judgements should be understood in terms of a ‘graded
continuum’ of condemnation [1]. Moreover, they may arguerspb20152037—28/12/15—19:16–Copy Edited by: Not Mentionedthat their statistical analysis shows that the authority depen-
dence, temporal and spatial distance factors explain a
substantial amount of the graded reduction of condemnation
in participants’ judgements when you take into account the
entire 5-point scale.
We are sceptical about modelling normative judgements
simply on a graded continuum (in terms of psychological val-
idity) [6]. We would argue that it is plausible to suppose that
participants parse the 5-point badness/goodness scale
categorically in terms of the act being wrong or not-wrong.
We do not see much psychological significance in shifts from
‘Extremely bad’ to ‘Bad’ in the context of their scale. This is
supported by the fact that a comparable number of responses
increased in their degree of condemnation as that decreased in
their degree of condemnation, among those responses that
retained an ‘Extremely bad’ or ‘Bad’ judgement: in this
group, averaging across the three probes, 10% shifted from
‘Bad’ to ‘Extremely bad’, while 16% shifted from ‘Extremely
bad’ to ‘Bad’ (74% retained the same level of badness).
Even setting aside this conceptual issue, we argue that a
graded-continuum approach to the data would still chal-
lenge their evolutionary hypothesis. To support their
evolutionary hypothesis, they would have to show that
the majority of responses in most field sites reduced the
initial judgement. Yet, again, Fessler et al. do not describe
their results in a way that addresses the issue of majority
responses. Table 2 presents the amount of responses that
did not reduce in condemnation as a result of the authority
dependence, temporal and spatial distances probes, either
because the initial badness judgement was maintained
(e.g. ‘Bad’/’Bad’) or because there was an increase in the
level of condemnation (‘Bad’/’Extremely bad’). In other
words, this table represents the amount of responses that
are inconsistent with the parochialism hypothesis, under
the graded-continuum approach.
As can be seen, even when accepting the graded-conti-
nuum approach, the clear majority of responses in all field
sites, and across all three probes, are inconsistent with the
parochialism hypothesis. These results again provide a
powerful challenge to their hypothesis about the evolution
of parochial morality, as such a claim depends on showing
that most people across societies are inclined to reduce their
condemnation of harmful acts when a local authority

































































ARTICLE IN PRESSIn sum, although we praise Fessler et al.’s use of cross-
cultural samples to test competing models of moral judge-
ment, we question their analysis of the data. When
analysed in the manner we outlined here, their findingsrspb20152037—28/12/15—19:16–Copy Edited by: Not Mentionedbecome consistent with our theoretical proposal [6], not
with theirs [1]. We leave it to the broader scientific commu-
nity to decide which is the most appropriate approach to
their data.alsocietypubReferences lishing.org
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